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Bankruptcy in the Seventh Circuit: 1992
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFF*
The Seventh Circuit continues to hear and decide a substantial number
of bankruptcy appeals. In 1992, as contrasted with the preceding two
years, there were fewer noteworthy opinions. However, among this smaller
number of decisions were several of great importance. This Article surveys
all decisions released on or before December 27, 1992, and addresses
the following topics: (1) Exemptions, (2) Estate Property, (3) Avoiding
Powers, (4) Chapter 13, (5) Conversion, and (6) Procedure.
I. EXEMPTIONS
Indiana is one of twenty-five American jurisdictions' that recognize
the existence of a special form of joint property ownership, the tenancy
by the entirety, available only to married couples. Property held in this
form of joint ownership is, in Indiana and some other jurisdictions,2
immune to collection activity pursued by creditors of either individual
spouse. The entirety estate is, however, always subject to being taken
in satisfaction of the claims of joint creditors.
While the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was in force, an individual spouse's
interest in the entirety asset did not become part of the bankruptcy
estate. Since its value could not be distributed to creditors, the protection
of this asset from creditors of only one spouse continued during bank-
ruptcy. Joint creditors were in a better position. Those with a lien on
the entirety estate could enforce the lien after bankruptcy. Unsecured
joint creditors were protected either by allowing them to reduce their
claims to judgment prior to discharge3 or by creating a separate marital
unit liability that could not be discharged during the course of a single
spouse bankruptcy.4
Passage of the 1988 Bankruptcy Code appeared to change the legal
status of entirety assets in two ways: It provided that the individual
spouse's interest was property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2),
* Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. I
am grateful for the research assistance of Stacia Yoon, J.D., 1992, Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington.
1. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MC) 801 - 814.1 (15th ed. 1992).
2. Some jurisdictions that recognize tenancy by the entirety allow individual
creditors to reach the entirety estate.
3. This practice originated in the Fourth Circuit. See Phillips v. Krakower, 46
F.2d 764, 766 (4th Cir. 1931).
4. Smith v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 218 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 1966).
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and it allowed exemption of the entirety interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(2)(B). Notwithstanding this new statutory language, courts con-
tinued to protect the interest of joint creditors either by holding that
the entirety interest did not become part of the bankruptcy estate 5 or
by disallowing the exemption claim when a joint creditor existed. 6 Now,
in two decisions, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that past practices cannot
continue in Indiana bankruptcies. Entirety interests are completely exempt
when only one spouse files for bankruptcy.
In In re Hunter,7 a joint creditor sought to obtain a judicial lien
on the entirety estate so that the in rem right thus created would protect
it following bankruptcy. There was authority for this action in other
circuits.' However, Judge Ripple emphatically rejected a similar approach
for Indiana debtors. He relied heavily on the provisions of Indiana Code
section 34-2-28-1(a)(5), which transforms Indiana's common law entirety
immunity into an express statutory exemption.
In a state such as Indiana, whose common law grants entirety
property immunity from creditors of one spouse alone, the effect
of section 522(b)(2)(B) - standing alone and without any ref-
erence to state statutory exemptions - is partially to exempt
entirety property: the property is subject to sale and distribution
to joint creditors, but exempted from claims of individual cred-
itors.
• . . By allowing the debtor to completely exempt his interest
in entirety property from the bankruptcy estate, Indiana has not
preserved the amenability of that property to creditors but shielded
it from all creditors, including joint creditors. 9
5. In re Jeffers, 3 B.R. 49, 56 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980). Since the entirety interest
did not enter the bankruptcy estate, it could not be exempted pursuant to § 522(b)(2)(B).
Jeffers also permitted the trustee to administer this asset for the benefit of joint creditors.
Id. at 57.
6. Napotnik v. Equibank and Parkvale Say. Ass'n, 679 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1982).
Napotnik involved a debtor's unsuccessful attempt to avoid a joint creditor's judgment
lien on an entirety estate pursuant to II U.S.C. § 522(0. The court held that the judgment
lien could not be avoided since the property was not exempt. Id. at 320. The property
was not exempt since state law permitted the creditor to obtain a judgment lien. Despite
this circular reasoning, Napotnik is often cited and has influenced the treatment of entirety
estates in three other circuits. See In re Garner, 952 F.2d 232 (8th Cir. 1991); Sumy v.
Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Grosslight, 757 F.2d 773 (6th Cir. 1985).
However, Owen v. Owen, 111 S. Ct. 1833 (1991), overrules these four cases by implication.
See Douglass G. Boshkoff, Entireties Estates in Individual Bankruptcies After Owen v.
Owen, Norton Bankr. Law Adviser 12 (Jan. 1993).
7. 970 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992).
8. See cases cited supra note 6.
9. 970 F.2d at 307-08.
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Hunter's sharp break with past practice was confirmed shortly there-
after when a second panel reached exactly the same conclusion in In
re Paeplow.10
We also reject the creditors' suggestion that the Indiana
legislature intended § 34-2-28-1(a)(5) to merely codify the Indiana
common law practice of immunizing entirety property from ex-
ecution by individual creditors (but not joint creditors) .... Most
significantly, this interpretation violates the plain meaning of the
Indiana statute, which reflects an intent to create a blanket
exemption for entirety property in the bankruptcy context. Thus,
we conclude that the Indiana legislature intended § 34-2-28-1(a)(5)
to shield the entirety property of a debtor in bankruptcy from
the claims of creditors - including joint creditors - to the
greatest degree possible.
We acknowledge that this interpretation may create the same
potential for legal fraud available to unscrupulous debtors under
the Act. (citation omitted) However, that result stems from
Indiana's decision to grant its residents such sweeping protection
of entirety property from the claims of creditors in bankruptcy.
Given the strong fresh start policy embodied in the Code, we
are hesitant to subvert that policy by crafting judicial exceptions
to discharge. (citations omitted)."
Following Hunter and Paeplow, the strategy for both debtors and
creditors is well-defined. Since the Indiana exemption is not available
in joint or consolidated cases, married couples seeking to protect property
held as tenants by the entirety should never file jointly."2 One spouse's
individual case should be closed before the second spouse's case is
commenced so that consolidation of the two individual cases is not
possible. Creditors, on the other hand, should attempt to force con-
solidation. An involuntary case should be filed for the second spouse,
if possible, and should be followed by a motion for consolidation.' 3
10. 972 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1992).
11. Id. at 737.
12. The special immunity for entireties interests exists because joint creditors have
different rights than creditors of an individual spouse. This difference disappears when
consolidation occurs. Even if the Indiana statute did not refer to joint or consolidated
cases, it is quite likely that the immunity would cease to exist in a consolidated case. Cf.
HENRY J. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.4 (3d ed. 1988)
(advising against the filing of a joint case when entirety property exists).
13. Hunter refused to consider whether the Indiana statute was preempted by
federal law because it purported to control the bankruptcy consequences of a joint filing
19931
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II. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
The status of pension plans in bankruptcy has been sharply debated
in recent years. Now that the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)-qualified plans
are not property of the estate,' 4 attention will shift to the trustee's rights
with regard to those remaining plans which do enter the estate. In re
Lyons 5 reminds us of a basic principle of bankruptcy law. The trustee's
right to an asset under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) 16 is no greater than the
right of the debtor. In Lyons, the nonexempt asset was a fund on
deposit in a retirement fund. The debtor was not entitled to the funds
unless she retired, became disabled, or terminated her employment. Since
none of these events had occurred at the date of the petition, the Seventh
Circuit decided that the trustee was not entitled to a turnover order. 7
The trustee now has three options when the debtor does not have
a present right to an asset. The trustee may:
(1) keep the estate open until the debtor becomes entitled to
the asset,
(2) attempt to sell the asset, or
(3) abandon the asset.
None of these options holds much promise. It is not practical to keep
the estate open except in unusual circumstances." Any attempt to sell
will probably not attract much interest. As soon as the property is
abandoned, the debtor may decide to quit her employment and withdraw
her contributions. Although this is a troubling possibility, it is a risk
accompanying any abandonment decision.
[T]here is always the possibility that the debtor will gain a great
windfall by quitting her state job and getting the contributions
or consolidation. This issue was not properly raised in the court below. See 970 F.2d at
306 nn.9-11. It is unlikely that a court will find that this statute has been pre-empted by
any provision in § 522. Cf. In re Ondras, 846 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1988); Stevens v. Pike
County Bank, 829 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1987).
14. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
15. 957 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1992). Accord In re Sanders, 969 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.
1992).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988).
17. 957 F.2d at 446.
18. The difficulty of keeping the estate open for a substantial period of time to
administer an asset is noted in Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1966). Courts
have, however, required that the estate be kept open when the benefit to the estate is
substantial. See, e.g., In re Schauer, 62 B.R. 526 (Bankr. Minn. 1986). Cf. In re William
Rakestraw Co., 450 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1971) (deciding that a claim comprising 20% of all
claims cannot be disallowed simply because process of allowance would prolong admin-
istration of the estate).
[Vol. 26:749
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back the day after the trustee abandons the contingent right to
recover the SERS contributions. However, the risk is no greater
than the risk that attends any decision by a Chapter 7 trustee
to seek court authority to abandon property of the estate. Events
can always happen that would make the value of the abandoned
property increase after abandonment.' 9
III. AVOIDING POWERS
In theory, the core concept of a preference is easily stated. A debtor
should not be able to favor a particular unsecured claimant on the eve
of bankruptcy. In practice, application of the six-part statutory definition
of a preference can be extraordinarily difficult, as illustrated in In re
Smith.20 In Smith, the debtor paid a creditor by check number one and
deposited check number two in his account. Until check number two
cleared, the debtor's account did not have a balance adequate to cover
check number one. Nonetheless, the bank provisionally credited the
debtor's account and paid check number one. Check number two bounced.
The bank then charged back the provisional credit. The debtor filed for
bankruptcy, and the trustee sought to recover the amount of check
number one from the creditor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The only
issue on appeal was whether there had been a "transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property."'"
It is well-established that the transfer of an asset owned by a third
party does not violate 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). If A satisfies the debtor's
obligation with A's separate property, there is no preference. 22 In Smith,
the crucial issue was the nature of the bank's provisional credit. Was
this credit something which belonged to the debtor or did it belong to
the bank? Although Judges Cudahy and Fairchild thought that the credit
represented something of value, they stopped short of finding that the
credit created a property interest. However, when the bank honored
check number one, "the provisional credit ripened into an interest in
property of the debtor," 23 and the payment by check was avoidable.
The majority's reasoning is unpersuasive. It ignores the distinction
between property transfers achieved through the exercise of power (when
19. In re Groves, 120 B.R. 956, 966 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
20. 966 F.2d 1527 (7th Cir. 1992).
21. Id. at 1529.
22. JAMES ANGELL MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 288
(1956). Recent decisions are collected and discussed in 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MB)
1 547.03(2) (15th ed. 1992).
23. 966 F.2d at 1535.
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the asset belongs to the debtor) and property transfers achieved through
the exercise of persuasion (when the asset belongs to someone else).
Only the existence of a property transfer achieved by the exercise of
power satisfies the requirement that the debtor's property be involved
in the transaction.
24
Judge Flaum, in dissent, correctly focused "upon the degree to which
the Debtor, as opposed to the Bank, had control over the funds at
issue.''25 He pointed out that, up to the very moment of transfer, the
debtor lacked the power to compel the bank to transfer the provisionally
credited funds to the creditor:
The Debtor could request, but not direct, the Bank to honor
its check . . . because the check was written on insufficient funds.
That the Bank complied with the Debtor's request by transferring
funds . . . was a matter of grace extended the Debtor by the
Bank. This is all a way of saying that the Debtor never had
dispositive control over the provisional credit.16
Despite the cogent reasoning contained in Judge Flaum's dissent,
other recent decisions are in accord with the majority's position . 2  In a
24. The majority's blurring of the difference between power and persuasion can
also be seen in an analogy used to bolster its conclusion:
Still, our discussion of the Indiana Commercial Code is not entirely sat-
isfying, since it fails to answer all of the questions definitively. One is still left
pondering the conundrum: How is it possible that property of the Debtor appeared
out of thin air, only to disappear in a matter of days? And if it disappeared
on its own, how could its transfer have diminished the Debtor's estate? ...
IT]he Debtor never had more than $164 in actual funds, so how could the
payment . . . have been from the Debtor's property?
We think that some answers to these difficult questions may lie in considering
the economic substance of the transaction at issue. In effect, the Debtor here
obtained a loan from the Bank (through the check-kiting scheme) and used the
loan proceeds to pay his debt . . . . We might say that the loan was unauthorized
or obtained by fraud, but it was nevertheless in economic reality a loan. That
is the best explanation for the Debtor's sudden acquisition of control over
$125,000 despite his previous actual wealth of only $164, and of his ability to
direct a valid $121,000 payment . . . . The situation is the same as if the Debtor
had gone to the Bank, taken out a five-day loan in cash and used the cash to
pay his creditor . ...
Id. at 1532.
In referring to a completed loan, the court did not choose the right analogy. The
bank's provisional credit was not the equivalent of a loan. It was only a nonbinding
commitment to extend credit. The debtor was able to pay the creditor only because the
bank was willing to honor this commitment.
25. Id. at 1537 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1539 (emphasis in original) (Flaum, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., In re Bohlen Enterprises, 859 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1988) (2-1 decision);
In re Montgomery, 136 B.R. 727 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
[Vol. 26:749
.. BANKRUPTCY
check-kiting situation, the creditor does not present a strong case for
retention of the funds since it received them only because of the bank's
unwise decision to honor the overdraft. The most equitable resolution
of the three party transaction would be to reject the preference challenge
but allow the bank to recover the funds mistakenly paid to the creditor.
Since this is not possible under existing law, 2 the recovery under 11
U.S.C. § 547(b) may be appealing as a second best alternative, even
though it creates an anomaly in preference law.
IV. CHAPTER 13
Congress, believing that increased use of Chapter 13 would produce
greater total bankruptcy distributions for unsecured creditors, sought to
divert debtors from liquidation bankruptcy by making an adjustment of
debts a more attractive option. For example, the discharge authorized
by 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)29 following a successful completion of the plan
is available to all debtors, without regard to whether they are eligible
for a Chapter 7 discharge. Furthermore, as originally structured, this
discharge was vastly superior to the one that could be obtained through
Chapter 7 proceedings. It discharged all but one of the obligations
excepted from discharge in 11 U.S.C. § 523.30
Perhaps, Congress' original proposal was too generous, In any event,
it seems that public support for a liberal discharge policy has lessened
since 1979. Not surprisingly then, legislative activity and judicial decisions
have combined to erode some of the pro-debtor features of Chapter 13.
There now are three additional exceptions to the discharge authorized
by § 1328(a). 3' Furthermore, courts are restricting access to Chapter 13
through use of good faith concepts with regard both to the proposal
of the plan and, more basically, the initiation of Chapter 13 proceedings.
In re Love32 is an important decision because it is the Seventh Circuit's
first consideration of the good faith requirement for initiation of Chapter
13 proceedings.
Robert Love was a tax protestor for five years before he filed for
protection under Chapter 13 in late 1986. His proposed plan dealt with
28. Demos v. Lyons, 376 A.2d 1352 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1977). The Demos
decision is discussed in 3 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 14.24(e) (1992
Supp.) and JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SOMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 17-2
(3d. ed. 1988).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1991).
30. Id. § 523 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Alimony and support claims remain excepted
from discharge under § 523(a)(5).
31. Criminal restitution obligations and debts referred to in § 523(a)(8) and (9)
were later added to the list of excepted obligations.
32. 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1992).
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only two debts, $1,600 owed to an unsecured creditor, and a substantially
larger tax obligation, some of which was a priority claim. The Chapter
13 case was dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) after the IRS
objected that it had not been commenced in good faith. In affirming
the action below, the court offered a number of observations concerning
the good faith standard.
First, it decided that the burden of proof varies with the context
in which the good faith issue is raised5 3 The plan proponent has the
burden of demonstrating that good faith is present when the issue arises
at confirmation. But when dismissal is sought, the objector must show
that the bankruptcy has not been commenced in good faith.
Second, in each instance, good faith is to be determined by the
totality of the circumstances.
[T]he focus of the good faith inquiry under both Section 1307
and Section 1325 is often whether the filing is fundamentally
fair to creditors and more generally, is the filing fundamentally
fair in a manner that complies with the spirit of the Bankruptcy
Code's provisions.
We realize that the standard of fundamental fairness does not
provide a great deal of needed guidance. Unfortunately, however,
we cannot completely alleviate the confusion and at the same
time retain the advantages of the totality of circumstances test.
This is because as our definition of good faith becomes more
precise, the bankruptcy court has less discretion to weigh the
evidence first hand in making good faith evaluations. In short,
the down side of the totality of circumstances test is a degree
of uncertainty.34
The court then went on to offer a nonexhaustive list of factors to
be considered in assessing a totality of the circumstances. Included in
this list was "how the debt arose." ' 35 The court agreed with the bankruptcy
judge's conclusion that bad faith was present in this case (1) because
the debtor had not been forthright in presenting information to the
court, and (2) because the bankruptcy was attributable to the debtor's
prepetition misconduct in conducting a multiyear tax protest. 36
The court's willingness to use prebankruptcy misconduct as a jus-
tification for denial of access to Chapter 13 is quite troubling.
37. Id. at 1355.
34. Id. at 1357.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1358.
[Vol. 26:749
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Prebankruptcy misbehavior often creates an obligation that will be non-
dischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding. At the same time, Congress'
use of discharge incentives to attract debtors to Chapter 13 makes it
likely that some plan proponents will have engaged in questionable
prebankruptcy conduct. Denying such debtors access to Chapter 13
because of such prebankruptcy behavior is inconsistent with the legislative
reliance on discharge incentives to attract debtors to this form of bank-
ruptcy. Tax protestors, no less than other wrongdoers, are entitled to
respond to the offer of a better discharge. Misconduct should not be
used to support a finding of bad faith unless it is possible to identify
misconduct related to concrete abuse of the bankruptcy process.37
V. CONVERSION
Do postpetition, preconversion assets become property of the bank-
ruptcy estate when a Chapter 13 debtor converts to Chapter 7? Although
11 U.S.C. § 348(a) provides that the date of case commencement remains
unchanged upon conversion, it does not specify whether 11 U.S.C. §§
54138 or § 130639 defines the property of the estate in the converted
case. In In re Lybrook,40 the choice of section was critical since the
debtor had inherited an asset more than 180 days after the commencement
of a Chapter 13 case, but prior to conversion. If § 541 defined the
estate following conversion, the inherited asset would not have been
property of the estate. The trustee, however, successfully argued that
this asset was part of the converted estate because § 1306 includes within
the bankruptcy estate assets acquired during the course of the Chapter
13 proceeding.
No clear rule can be derived from the statutory language. 4 ' Judge
Posner, therefore, looked to the incentives he thought might be present
in situations like this. He concluded that the inheritance should be part
of the bankruptcy estate in order "to discourage strategic, opportunistic
behavior that hurts creditors without advancing any legitimate interest
of debtors." ' 42 No doubt, inclusion of postpetition, preconversion assets
37. In Love's case, there was misconduct-failure to schedule assets and a failure
to provide a realistic projection of disposable income. Id. "One of the surest ways for
a Chapter 13 debtor to get into good faith problems is to misrepresent income, expenses,
assets, or other matters." I KErrIH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 5.17 (1992).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
39. Id. § 1306 (1988).
40. 951 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1991).
41. See Robert J. Volpi, Property of the Bankruptcy Estate After a Conversion
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7: The Need for a Definite Answer, 68 IND. L.J. 489, 496-
504 (1993).
42. 951 F.2d at 137.
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in the converted estate eliminates an incentive to convert in a situation
such as this. It also creates a powerful disincentive to starting out in
Chapter 13. After Lybrook, any debtor aware of the possibility of an
inheritance should pass up Chapter 13 and file immediately under Chapter
7. Then, when 180 days passes, there will be no further risk of losing
the inheritance.
The net impact of these various incentives is unclear and the juris-
prudence of conversion is a collection of confusing, and often conflicting,
authorities. 43 For example, one Eighth Circuit opinion cited by Judge
Posner in support of his position is one which permits opportunistic
behavior by a debtor in the context of a different legal controversy."
Confusion is present in this area of the law for several reasons. First,
there is judicial disagreement over whether and when debtors ought to
be permitted to gain an advantage by moving between chapters. Second,
given the variety of issues which can arise upon conversion, and the
conflicting policy considerations presented by various fact patterns, it is
unlikely that one or two simple rules will ever be sufficient to spell out
all the consequences of conversion in a satisfactory fashion. 45
Let us assume that it is necessary to regulate movement between
chapters. There are two ways to deal with the problem of opportunistic
change: (1) assign consequences to the act of conversion which limit the
potential for gain through inter-chapter movement, or (2) restrict the
situations in which conversion can take place. The former approach
affects all converting debtors including those who do not have an op-
portunistic motivation." Lybrook, for example, attempts to control the
problem of opportunistic conversion by adopting a uniform rule that
property of the estate is defined by § 1306. Another, and possibly
superior, approach to the problem of opportunistic movement between
chapters may eventually be found in rules limiting the debtor's unres-
tricted right to convert from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7.47
43. See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MB) 1 348.01-07 (15th ed. 1992).
44. In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984) (allowing a different homestead
exemption at the time of conversion than the one the debtors designated at the com-
mencement of their bankruptcy proceedings).
45. For example, the Tenth Circuit has recently indicated that different rules will
control the consequences of conversion from Chapters 13 and 11 to Chapter 7. See In
re Calder, 973 F.2d 862, 866 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992).
46. Assume that a Chapter 13 debtor inherits property as in Lybrook. He also
becomes disabled, loses his job, no longer has sufficient regular income to fund his plan,
and converts to Chapter 7. Lybrook calls for inclusion of the inheritance in his converted
Chapter 7 estate even though the conversion is not opportunistic.
47. See Volpi supra note 41, at 519-22.
[Vol. 26:749
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VI. PROCEDURE
The post-Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 48 bifur-
cation of authority49 to adjudicate continues to provide litigants with
the opportunity to delay decision making by forcing withdrawal of
controversies from the bankruptcy judge. One possible strategy is to
demand a jury trial. If the demand is well-founded, In re Grabill Corp.50
now aligns the Seventh Circuit with the majority view that withdrawal
is mandatory. The bankruptcy judge is not authorized to conduct a jury
trial.
In re Edwards" is the other notable procedural decision. In this
case, a mortgagee had not received notice of a sale free of lien authorized
under 11 U.S.C. § 363(0. It sought postjudgment relief pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).12 Because more than one year
had passed since the sale, the mortgagee was forced to argue that, absent
proper notice, the sale was void."
Judge Posner, writing for the court, refused to adopt the view that
lack of notice alone warranted vacating the sale.
We are left with the practical question, in what circumstances
can a civil judgment be set aside without limit of time and
without regard to the harm of innocent third parties? (citation
omitted) The answer requires a consideration of competing in-
terests rather than a formula.
To take away a person's property-and a lien is property-
without compensation or even notice is pretty shocking, but we
have property rights on both sides of the equation here, since
Guernsey wants to take away property that Noble bought and
Northwest financed, without compensating them for their loss.
As we said before, the liquidation of bankrupt estates will be
impeded if the bonafide purchaser cannot obtain a good title,
and creditors will suffer. The strong policy of finality of bank-
ruptcy sales embodied in section 363(m) provides, in turn, strong
support for the principle that a bona fide purchaser at a bank-
ruptcy sale gets good title (citations omitted) even if the section
48. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
50. 976 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992).
51. 962 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1992).
52. Bankruptcy Rule 9024 provides (with three exceptions) that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) governs requests for postjudgment relief in bankruptcy proceedings.
53. There is no specific time limit on an application for relief from a "void"
judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
19931
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does not of its own force preclude collateral attack on such
sales. . . Rule 60(b) must be interpreted in light of this policy.
The policy would mean rather little if years after the sale a
secured creditor could undo it by showing that through some
slip-up he hadn't got notice of it.1
4
There is Seventh Circuit authority both supporting" and opposing5 6
the view that failure to give notice results in a "void" judgment. The
court in this instance opted to sustain the sale because (1) it thought
that the policy of finality was the most important consideration, and
(2) it doubted that the objecting creditor had been damaged by the
failure to give proper notice."
54. 962 F.2d at 644-45.
55. Rodd v. Region Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1986) (improper service
of process).
56. In re Whitney-Forbes, Inc., 770 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1985) (failure to give notice
of bankruptcy sale).
57. 962 F.2d at 645-46.
[Vol. 26:749
